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Despite agriculture’s importance in terms of its relationship to poverty and welfare of the 
poorest households, the government finds it increasingly difficult to find the fiscal space for 
budgetary allocations for agriculture and agricultural R&D. We hypothesise that expansion of 
expenditures on agriculture is possible in the short to medium run with a combination of re-
allocations and new taxation. We argue that existing spending aimed towards the agriculture 
sector includes very large outlays on implicit subsidies that are largely unproductive. These 
costs include: subsidisation of gas for fertiliser plants, which approach Rs 48 billion in gas 
subsidies to fertiliser companies; the full costs of the infrastructure and operation and 
maintenance of the irrigation system, which amount to Rs 166 billion per year; and losses on 
wheat procurement, which have been about Rs 25 billion recently.  
On the taxation side, while agricultural producers are not currently liable to pay tax on 
income, they do however pay indirect taxes on agricultural inputs. Using a Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM), we estimate agricultural producer pay about Rs 61 billion, mostly from GST 
taxes on fertiliser.  Using a Computable General Equilibrium model, we show that agriculture 
could contribute further with an income tax on agricultural income. With a ―low-rate-wide-
base‖ income tax of 15 percent on non-poor, medium and large farms, as much as Rs 130 
billion could be raised, enough to cover, for example, a sizable portion of the operation and 
maintenance cost of the irrigation system.  
JEL Classifications: D58, E16, H20, H22, H23, Q10 
Keywords: Agriculture, Fiscal Policy, Subsidies, Taxation, General Equilibrium, 
Social Accounting Matrix, Pakistan  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Finding the fiscal space for development expenditures and investment is always a 
challenge for developing countries. This is especially difficult in a country with twin 
deficit problems and frequently high inflation, along with requirements for a large 
military budget. Under the directive of IMF programs, Pakistan has been seeking to arrest 
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its growing fiscal deficits through tax reforms. However, these have had limited short-
term impact on the tax-to-GDP ratio (see Table 1). When fiscal space is not growing, and 
is seen as a very binding constraint, investments such as agricultural R&D fail to be 
prioritised. In this paper, we show that even in what appears to be a severely constrained 
financial environment, fiscal space can be found with structural analysis and 
rationalisation of existing spending to maintain key development investments.  
 
Table 1 
Tax to GDP Ratio 
  2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 
GDP (fc, current prices) 14,249 17,648 19,362 21,497 23,904 25,822 
Tax Revenue  1,483 1,679 2,025 2,125 2,514 2,910 
Tax to GDP Ratio 10.4% 9.5% 10.5% 9.9% 10.5% 11.3% 
Sources: Government of Pakistan. Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2015, and Federal 
Budget in Brief, various issues. 
 
Spending on agricultural R&D in Pakistan has lagged. In 2009, for every $100 of 
agricultural output in Pakistan, $0.21 was invested in agricultural R&D. This level 
represents a decline from a high of 0.43 in 1991 and indicates that investments failed to 
keep pace with growth in the country’s agricultural GDP. This ratio is also one of the 
lowest in South Asia, when compared with India (0.40), Sri Lanka (0.34), Bangladesh, 
(0.32), and Nepal (0.26) [ASTI-PARC (2012)]. 
Two common assertions are made to explain or justify this: either that the present 
fiscal space in Pakistan is too tight for spending on agriculture, or that the sector pays no 
taxes, leading to the (debatable) conclusion that agriculture therefore cannot and/or 
should not be a beneficiary of government spending.   
We explore the validity of both assertions and conduct a review of taxes and 
subsidies related to the agriculture sector in Pakistan. We use a new 2011 Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Pakistan [PSSP (2015)] to attribute indirect tax revenues 
paid on commodities to sectors, and we bring together recent literature on implicit 
subsidies in agriculture, to create a comprehensive picture of the fiscal aspects of the 
sector. We show that the sector does in fact pay taxes in the form of indirect taxes on 
inputs, though the potential for further direct taxes exists, and, with a combination of 
plausible subsidy rationalisations and new taxes, sufficient fiscal space can be found to 
double spending on agriculture R&D.    
In Section 1, we begin with an overview of the current state of fiscal space in 
the overall government. In Section 2, we review recent literature on subsidies  in 
agriculture, particularly the subsidies on fertiliser, of wheat farmers and millers, and 
irrigation water. In Section 3, we look at the structure of taxation in the country and 
estimate the amount of indirect taxes that can be attributed to agriculture . In Section 
4, we use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to estimate the potential 
for revenue generation from a tax on agricultural incomes. Section 5 provides our 
summaries and conclusions.  
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SECTION 1: 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE STATE OF FISCAL SPACE 
Much of Pakistan’s available financial resources go to defense spending, debt 
repayment and servicing, and the running of the government itself, leaving little for 
development expenditures in general. Figure 1 shows the federal government’s spending, 
where the share of development related spending (on Federal Public Sector Development 
Plan - PSDP, development grants to provinces, and ―other development expenditure‖) is 
dwarfed by current expenditures.  
 
Fig. 1.  Breakdown of Federal Government Spending 
(Billion Rs) 
 
Source: GoP, Ministry of Finance, Federal Budget in Brief, various issues. 
 
In this analysis, we start with 2009-10 to capture the pre-devolution period. In 
2010-11, devolution came into effect in Pakistan and major federal ministries were 
dissolved. Subjects such as health, education and agriculture, formerly controlled at the 
federal level, became provincial subjects such that provincial departments for these 
subjects are now the primary policy-making institutions and provincial governments 
control their budgetary allocations. As the size of the federal government shrank, the 
federal government chose to allocate a larger share to subsidies and (non-development) 
grants.
1
 The share of PSDP and non-PSDP development expenditures, in 2010-11, 
shrank. While, the share of the PSDP has since returned to normal ―pre-devolution‖ 
levels, in the absence of ministries for food, health and education, the federal government 
now allocates larger shares towards subsidies and/or non-development grants. 
 
1These grants include grants-in-aid to provinces and grants to others. Grants to others form the bulk of 
these grants with large outlays including, in 2015-16, allocations for ―contingent liabilities‖, ―miscellaneous 
grants‖, ―other outstanding liabilities‖, and transfers to AJK, Gilgit Baltistan, and loss-making public sector 
enterprises. 
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Fig. 2.  Share of Provinces vs. Federal Share in Gross Revenues Based  
on Revised Allocations 
(Billion Rs) 
 
Source: GoP, Ministry of Finance, Federal Budget in Brief, various issues. 
 
Fig. 3.  Federal PSDP and Provincial PSDP 
(Billion Rs) 
 
Source: GoP, Ministry of Finance, Federal Budget in Brief, various issues. 
 
Post-devolution, these federal ministries have been replaced with provincial 
counterparts (though new federal ministries have also been created to provide a central 
coordinating body). For agriculture, the former federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
was dissolved and responsibilities shifted to agriculture departments in the provinces. 
However, it became apparent quickly that Federal dimensions were still needed and the 
Ministry of National Food Security and Research (MNFSR) was created.  In tandem, the 
2009 (or 7th) National Finance Commission awarded the provinces a larger share of the 
 Fiscal Space for Investment in Agriculture  877 
―divisible pool‖ of tax revenues beginning in 2010-11. As a result, the provincial share in 
gross revenues grew from 31 percent of the total revenues in 2009-10, the year before 
devolution started, to 39 percent in 2014-15.  
 
SECTION 2: 
REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES TOWARDS AGRICULTURE 
The government’s expenditure on Pakistan’s agriculture sector takes the form of a 
few major interventions. On the output side, the government’s most direct engagement 
with the sector is through wheat procurement and procurement pricing.  
On the input side, the government has intervened in the fertiliser sector (since 
1989) with an import-substitution policy that supports local fertiliser manufacturers. In 
addition to fertiliser, the government plays a major role in water for irrigation as the 
provider, operator and maintainer of large dams, barrages and a massive canal-based 
irrigation system that is critical to agriculture.  
Furthermore, the government has historically played a role in agricultural R&D 
and provides extension services to farmers through which information and new 
technologies are disseminated. In the past, these measures were coordinated by the 
Federal Ministry of Agriculture, and research activities were led by its Pakistan 
Agricultural Research Council (PARC). Devolution in 2010 led to the Federal Ministry 
of Agriculture being dissolved in favour of provincial departments instead, which now 
hold the responsibilities (and finances) for such interventions. While a Ministry for 
National Food Security and Research was created at the Federal level, and PARC 
remained Federal, the total budget allocation for agriculture declined sharply: in 2009-10, 
the Food and Agriculture division received Rs 12 billion (according to the revised budget 
figure) in the PSDP. Since its inception, the new MNFSR has received significantly 
smaller allocations ranging from Rs 3 to 5 billion (as per the revised budget figures).  
Hence, the government’s major outlay towards the agriculture sector is now dominated 
by the three major subsidies/interventions mentioned earlier. 
 
Subsidy to Fertiliser Manufacturers 
The government of Pakistan has been following an import-substitution strategy for 
the fertiliser sector via what is effectively a subsidy to local fertiliser manufacturers: gas 
is provided to fertiliser producers as ―feedstock‖ at prices substantially lower than what 
other sectors pay for gas (―fuel-stock‖). Ali, et al. (2015) calculate the rupee value of this 
subsidy, and found that, in 2013-14, the loss to the government ballooned to Rs 48 billion 
(from Rs 6 billion in 2000-01). This sharp increase occurred due to the country’s energy 
crisis and consequent increases in fuel prices (Table 3).   
This loss is especially large when compared with the government’s spending on 
agricultural R&D (estimated to be about Rs 8 billion in 2009 by ASTI-PARC 2012) and 
budget allocations for the ministry of national food security and research (Rs 5.5 billion 
in 2014-15).  
Ali, et al. (2015) argue that, in recent years, this loss is not justifiable since 2009-10 
when the international price of urea experienced sharp declines but the price of domestically 
produced urea increased consistently, while a severe energy shortfall arose in the country. 
Figure 4 shows these trends and the price of domestic urea if there were no subsidy.  
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Table 3 
Value of Subsidy to Fertiliser Production 
Year 
Gas Prices 
(Rs/mcf) Feed 
Stock Fuel-Stock 
Difference in 
Price 
Gas Consumed 
(billion mcf) 
Total Production 
Subsidy* (Billion 
PKR) 
2000-01 63.9 117.2 53.2 106.0 5.64 
2001-02 70.8 95.6 24.7 110.0 2.72 
2002-03 76.1 170.4 94.4 112.8 10.64 
2003-04 79.6 175.7 96.1 116.1 11.16 
2004-05 61.2 185.7 124.5 119.9 14.93 
2005-06 110.8 229.2 118.4 124.2 14.71 
2006-07 124.7 256.7 132.0 122.8 16.20 
2007-08 124.7 256.6 132.0 128.1 16.90 
2008-09 120.3 341.2 220.9 129.6 28.63 
2009-10 132.3 360.4 228.1 140.5 32.05 
2010-11 138.7 375.2 236.5 140.7 33.29 
2011-12 161.8 492.4 330.6 135.0 44.62 
2012-13 116.3 460.0 343.7 116.7 41.37 
2013-14 123.4 488.2 364.8 128.3 48.04 
Source: Ali, et al. (2015). 
Notes:  * The production subsidy on fertiliser is calculated as the difference between fertiliser feedstock and 
fuel-stock prices per million British thermal units (MMBTU), multiplied by the amount of feedstock 
gas used by each firm and then aggregated for the sector. The conversion from million cubic feet 
(MMCFT) to MMBTU was done at the rate of 1 MMCFT=950 MMBTU for SSGCL and SNGPL, 
and at the rate of 1 MMCFT=750 MMBTU for Mari Gas. Gas consumption figures for the sector 
were obtained from HDIP (2013), NFDC (1998), NFDC (2008), and NFDC (2014). 
 
Beginning in 2009-10, in the absence of the subsidy, the price of domestic urea 
(produced using local gas growing increasingly short in supply) would have been about 
the same as that of foreign urea, or higher. In 2013-14, the price of domestic urea was 
higher, even with the subsidy. Ali, et al. (2015) conclude that the subsidy benefits only 
fertiliser companies, and is resulting in the misallocation of scarce natural gas.  
 
Fig. 4.  International versus Domestic Urea Prices with and Without  
Subsidies (1995–2014) 
 
Source: Ali, et al. (2015) 
Note: Domestic price without subsidy is calculated by adding back the per unit subsidy to domestic prices. 
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Subsidisation of Irrigation Waters 
A major source of government expenditures for agriculture, which is basically a 
subsidy, is for irrigation infrastructure. In 2007, the Punjab Irrigation and Power 
Department (IPD) made an inventory of assets used in the irrigation system for the 
management of these assets.  (This document, written by the Strategic Planning/Reform 
Unit of the IPD, is hereafter called AMP for Asset Management Plan.) Making use of the 
data from that analysis, Davies (2012) derived the annual costs for the various 
infrastructures in the irrigation system. Based on that work, it was possible to estimate the 
annual costs to maintain that infrastructure. 
Figure 5 provides perspectives on the infrastructure required to distribute water 
through the irrigation system, from dams through the extensive network of barrages, main 
and secondary canals.  The costs in the Figure essentially start from the source of water in 
a dam (at the top) and show costs for infrastructure at each step through the irrigation 
system. These are on a per hectare basis and are annual costs.  The largest cost is to 
support infrastructure related to the main canals, which would cost $43.68 per year for 
each hectare.  The second largest costs are dams and secondary canals, which cost $37.82 
and $27.63 respectively, per hectare.  The overall costs are $135.47 per year per hectare.  
For comparison, the gross margin of a wheat producer, from a recent analysis of resource 
conservation technologies, was about $600 per hectare.  While the gross margin is not 
profits, and some expenses have to come out of it, a farmer could pay, but full payment 
will be a challenge to absorb, especially for smaller farmers.  Therefore some 
participation by the government seems likely to be needed.   
The Punjab IPD, as part of the assessment of its irrigation infrastructure, 
determined whether certain expenses should be supported by the public or private sectors.  
The headworks and barrages, link canals and drainage infrastructure should be left in the 
public sector, presumably because they are national, or are part of the main Indus River 
system, or are external to farm decisions.  The portion of dam costs that goes into storage 
is put in the private sector, but it could well be that some of those expenses could 
logically go to the public sector.   The net result is that cost per hectare to farmers to keep 
up and supervise irrigation infrastructure would be $114.30 per hectare, or $1.66 billion 
per year to service 14.6 million hectares of irrigated crop land. 
 
Fig. 5.  Total Irrigation Costs, Dollars/Hectare 
 
Source: Davies (2012). 
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Wheat Procurement Subsidies 
Wheat procurement by the government remains a major case of explicit 
subsidisation of Pakistan’s agriculture sector wherein the government purchases 
wheat from farmers at government set prices, and restrictions are imposed on the 
import and export of wheat by the private sector. Successive governments have 
continued these interventions in some form since independence, with the objective of 
supporting both farmers (with high producer prices) and consumers (by managing 
food inflation).  
Dorosh and Salam (2008) find that, in terms of supporting wheat producers, it is 
only 20 percent of wheat farmers who are relatively large and produce surpluses that are 
able to sell to the government, and that 20 percent of wheat farmers are in fact net 
purchasers of wheat.  
In the next stage, wheat procured by the government is sold to flour mills (on 
quota basis) at release prices set below per unit procurement costs, to the benefit of 
millers and resulting in losses to the government. On the consumer side, Dorosh and 
Salam (2008) employ price multiplier analysis and find that the final impact on overall 
inflation levels is not very large.  
 
Table 5 
Wheat Procurement Unit Subsidy and Total Subsidy, 2005-06 to 2012-13 
Year 
Procurement 
Quantity 
Support 
Price 
Release 
Price 
Unit 
Subsidy* 
Financial 
Loss* 
Financial 
Loss* 
('000 tons) (Rs/kg) (Rs/kg) (Rs/kg) (Bn Rs) (Bn 12/13 Rs) 
2005-06 3,939 10.38 10.75 1.40 5.51 12.18 
2006-07 4,514 10.63 11.63 1.13 5.08 10.41 
2007-08 4,422 15.63 15.63 2.15 9.51 17.40 
2008-09 3,917 23.75 18.75 7.76 30.41 46.07 
2009-10 9,231 23.75 24.38 4.28 39.46 53.53 
2010-11 6,715 23.75 26.25 3.50 23.50 28.01 
2011-12 6,150 26.25 33.25 1.08 6.61 7.10 
2012-13 5,948 30.00 33.25 4.18 24.84 24.84 
Ave 06-08 4,292 12.21 12.67 1.56 6.70 13.33 
Ave 11-13 6,271 26.67 30.92 2.92 18.32 19.98 
Source: Dorosh, et al. (2015). 
* Possible financial loss for each year is calculated as the unit subsidy (domestic procurement price plus 
the cost of incidentals minus the release price) times the quantity of domestic procurement. 
 
Thus, the direct benefits of this wheat subsidy are limited to the relatively large 
wheat farmers and wheat millers while the losses incurred are substantial. Dorosh, et al. 
(2015) estimate that in 2012-13, the total cost to the government of these interventions 
(accounting for storage and handling costs) was Rs 25 billion. In other years, (FY 2009 
and FY 2010) this loss was as high as Rs 46 -54 billion in real terms. See Table 5. The 
average loss over the period FY 2011–FY 2013 was 50 percent higher in real terms than 
the average over the period FY 2006–FY 2008 due largely to a 46 percent increase in the 
average quantity procured each year. Reducing quantities of procurement to earlier levels 
could save 6.7 billion rupees per year.  
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SECTION 3 
A REVIEW OF TAX COLLECTION IN PAKISTAN 
 
Major Taxes in Pakistan  
Historically, Pakistan has relied considerably on indirect taxes to raise revenues, 
particularly the General Sales Tax (GST)—an ad valorem tax imposed on various goods. 
Furthermore, in 2010-11, tax reforms led to the removal of numerous GST exemptions, 
including exemptions for agricultural inputs such as fertiliser,
2
 which had been 
introduced over the years on various commodity groups in ad-hoc measures. Table 6 
decomposes Pakistan’s total tax collection by type of tax for 2012-13, when these 
reforms had become effective.  It shows that 60 percent of taxes came from indirect taxes 
in that fiscal year (FY).  
Direct taxes accounted for 33 percent of tax revenues in 2012-13, which came 
mainly from either withholding tax (WHT), deducted at the source on salaries, contracts, 
and bank transactions, or as income taxes paid by various businesses. Agricultural 
enterprises, however, are exempt from paying these.  This means that GST paid on inputs 
is, formally, the only point at which the agricultural producer currently becomes subject 
to taxation. However, withholding taxes on imported goods (classified as direct taxes by 
the FBR) are also arguably borne by producers who purchase them if these passed by 
importers. In the following, we estimate the total tax revenues (indirect taxes on inputs 
and WHT on imports) that can be attributed to the agriculture sector.  
 
Table 6 
Overall Tax Collection by Type of Tax—FY 2013 
(Billion Rs) 
 
Federal Provincial Total % Share 
Indirect Taxes 1,348 5 1,352 60 
Excise taxes 121 5 126 6 
GST - on domestic goods 413 
 
413 18 
GST - on imports 430 
 
430 19 
Surcharges 142 
 
142 6 
Custom duties 249 
 
249 11 
Export rebates (customs) -8 
 
-8 0 
Direct Taxes 743 7 750 33 
Withholding taxes (WHT) on imports 103 
 
103 5 
All other WHT (salaries, contracts, banking etc.) 279 
 
279 12 
Other income taxes (other than WHT) 340 7 347 15 
Other direct taxes (non-income tax) 21 
 
21 1 
Other Taxes (stamp duties, motor vehicle taxes etc.) 
 
142 142 6 
Total 2,091 153 2,244 100 
Source: Federal Board of Revenue Annual Report 2012-13 for federal taxes, Economic Survey 2013-14 for 
provincial taxes. 
 
2Presidential Amendment Ordinance, 2011—SRO 229(I)/2011—Dated 15.03.2011—Through this 
notification the Federal Government  rescinded three notifications namely SRO 535(I)/2008 Dated 11.06.2008, 
SRO 536(I)/2008 Dated 11.06.2008 & SRO 706(I)/2008 Dated 02.08.2010 withdrawing exemption of sales tax 
on fertilisers, pesticides & agricultural tractors respectively. 
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Indirect Tax Revenues Raised from the Agriculture Sector 
While agricultural enterprises are exempt from income taxes, they do pay indirect taxes 
on inputs. Agricultural inputs such as fertilisers and pesticides were exempted from GST in 
2008, but tax reforms in 2011 led to a loss of this exemption, and then, agricultural inputs 
were subject to the standard 17 percent rate. The FBR reports indirect tax collections by 
commodities on which they are paid. We disaggregate indirect tax revenues (and WHT on 
imports) by the sector that must have purchased these commodities using demand shares from 
a 2011 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Pakistan [PSSP (2015)].  
 
Table 7 
Structure of Aggregate Demand—2011 SAM 
(Percentages)  
 Demand Share of 
Commodities 
Agricul- 
-ture* 
Manufac- 
-turing* 
Services 
excl. 
Transport 
Transport Households 
and 
Government 
Investment 
and Stocks 
World Total 
Crops 10.23 77.06 2.20 0.00 8.40 1.69 0.43 100 
Fruits and 
Vegetables 
5.22 0.07 4.87 0.00 82.41 0.47 6.96 100 
Livestock and 
Poultry 
0.64 24.95 0.27 0.00 62.58 11.52 0.05 100 
Forestry and 
Fishing 
0.67 20.04 2.73 0.00 68.47 0.00 8.09 100 
Mining 0.00 79.70 0.43 0.00 13.53 2.56 3.78 100 
Manufacturing 
of Food 
3.27 10.28 4.88 0.02 76.30 0.63 4.63 100 
Manufacturing 0.37 39.49 4.89 2.80 26.36 9.46 16.63 100 
Petroleum  0.31 46.54 5.39 20.90 22.05 0.17 4.64 100 
Fertilisers 86.14 13.21 0.53 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.02 100 
Energy 1.69 66.61 5.83 0.85 25.01 0.01 0.00 100 
Construction 0.02 15.33 21.80 1.01 0.00 61.76 0.09 100 
Services 0.54 11.02 37.51 4.32 43.90 0.02 2.70 100 
Transport 0.39 6.80 63.84 2.92 22.08 0.00 3.98 100 
Source: Pakistan Social Accounting Matrix 2011(PSSP 2015) 
          * Agriculture includes crops, livestock, fruits and vegetables, livestock and poultry, and forestry and fishing. 
 
Manufacturing Includes Mining, Manufacturing, Energy and Construction  
A SAM captures the flows of incomes and expenditures in the economy between 
producers, factors of production, households, government and tax accounts, savings and 
investment, and the rest of the world.  Table 7 presents, in condensed form, the demand-
side of the economy from the 2011 Pakistan SAM.  It shows that the agriculture sector 
purchases 10.2 percent of crops, 5.2 percent of fruits and vegetables and so on. (Note that 
it purchases 82 percent of all fertiliser). We then assume that since agriculture buys 10.2 
percent of crops, then 10.2 percent of taxes collected on sales of crops must have been 
paid by agricultural enterprises; similarly for all other commodities. 
These calculations show that the agriculture sector paid approximately Rs 46 
billion in taxes via purchases of inputs in FY 2013 (Table 8). This sum was paid 
primarily from three major taxes: Rs 21 billion was paid as GST on domestic goods; Rs 
12 billion as GST on imported goods; and Rs 6 billion as WHT on imported goods.
3
  
 
3 This calculation leaves out indirect taxes on purchases of capital goods such as tractors. In the SAM these 
purchases are captured under a single investment account, i.e. capital purchases by agriculture are not separated. 
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Table 8 
Estimated Taxes Paid by Agriculture by Type of Tax—(Billion Rs)—FY 2013 
 
Paid by 
Agriculture 
Overall 
Tax Collection 
% Paid by 
Agriculture 
Indirect Taxes    
Excise taxes 2.57 121 2.1% 
GST – domestic 20.91 413 5.1% 
GST – Imports 12.48 430 2.9% 
Surcharges 0.34 142 0.2% 
Custom duties 2.08 249 0.8% 
Import duties rebate -0.06 -8 -0.8% 
Direct Taxes    
WHT on Imports 7.36 743 1.0% 
TOTAL 45.68 2,091 2.2% 
Source: Calculated using Tables 6 and 7. 
 
In Table 9, this payment is disaggregated by type of tax and the commodities that 
these were paid on. Agriculture paid most of its taxes (Rs 33 billion) on the purchase of 
fertiliser. The second largest tax payment (of Rs 6 billion) was on the purchase of 
―Manufacturing—Food‖ which includes feeds purchased by the livestock and poultry 
sub-sectors.    
These taxes, particularly GST on fertiliser and animal feeds, add to the costs of 
farmers. However, looking at the sector as a whole, we find that indirect taxes are small 
relative to intermediate cost and value-added. Based on the input-output structure of the 
agriculture sector from the 2011 Pakistan SAM, indirect taxes on intermediates are 
approximately 4.3 percent of total intermediate costs and 0.9 percent of value-added (see 
Table 10). This is however a sector-level view. It may very well be that GST on fertiliser 
(being regressive in nature) is in fact prohibitive for smaller farmers. It is also likely that 
much of the agricultural value-added reported comes from larger farmers. All this adds 
towards a case for direct taxation on agricultural incomes.  
 
Table 9 
Federal Taxes Paid by Agriculture on Inputs—by Type of Tax and  
Input Commodity Groups—FY 2013 
(Billion Rs) 
 Inputs 
Indirect Taxes on Inputs Direct Taxes 
Total 
Excise 
Taxes 
GST- 
Domestic 
GST- 
Imports 
Surcharges Custom 
Duties 
Import Duty 
Rebate 
WHT on 
Imports 
Crops 0 0.9 0.7 0 0.16 0 0.64 2.4 
All other agriculture 0 0.01 0.17 0 0.16 0 0.22 0.56 
Manufacturing, food* 2.42 1.41 1.25 0 0.96 -0.04 0.45 6.45 
Manufacturing, other** 0.06 0.29 0.65 0 0.49 -0.02 0.24 1.72 
Mining and Petroleum  0 0.58 0.48 0.34 0.06 0 0 1.45 
Fertiliser 0 17.67 9.09 0 0 0 5.8 32.57 
Energy and Services 0.09 0.05 0.15 0 0.24 -0.01 0 0.52 
TOTAL 2.57 20.91 12.48 0.34 2.08 -0.06 7.36 45.68 
Source: Calculated using Tables 6 and 7. 
Notes: Calculations assume all indirect taxes and WHT on imports passed on to buyers.   
* ―Manufacturing, food‖ includes the manufacture of feeds for the livestock sector.  
** ―Manufacturing, other‖ includes the manufacture of pesticides. 
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Table 10 
Agriculture Input-output Structure (FY 2013) 
 Agriculture’s Payments to: * Billion Rs IO Ratio* 
Crops 313 5% 
Fruits and Vegetables 28 0% 
Livestock and Poultry, Forestry and Fishing 23 0% 
Manufacturing—Food (includes Feeds) 238 4% 
Manufacturing (includes Pesticides) 49 1% 
Mining and Petroleum Products 7 0% 
Fertiliser 271 4% 
Energy 41 1% 
Construction & Services 87 1% 
Transport 16 0% 
A: Total Intermediate Cost  1,072 17% 
B: Indirect Taxes on Intermediates 45.7 1% 
C: Value Added of Agriculture** 5,269 82% 
Gross Output (A+B+C) 6,387 100% 
Indirect Taxes as % of Intermediate Cost (B:A) 4.3%  
Indirect Taxes as % of Value Added (B:C) 0.9%  
* Payments for intermediates based on Input-Output ratios from SAM 2011and agriculture value added in 
FY2013. 
** Economic Survey 2014: GDP at factor cost of agriculture excluding cotton ginning, revised FY2013. 
 
We conclude that while agriculture does pay a non-trivial amount in taxes under 
the GST system, the input-output and value-added structure of the sector contains ample 
space for further taxation. Tax payments by agriculture as a whole are only about 1 
percent of agricultural value-added which is high (82 percent of gross output). We also 
compare indirect taxes paid by agriculture with indirect taxes paid by other sectors 
(calculated in a similar manner). Table 11 confirms that taxes paid by agriculture are low 
considering, for example, that agricultural value added in FY 2013 was larger than that of 
all manufacturing (Economic Survey 2013-14), and that other sectors pay income taxes in 
addition. 
 
Table 11 
Taxes Paid on Intermediates—Comparison across Selected Sectors  
(Billion Rs—FY2013) 
  Indirect Taxes Paid by: 
  Agriculture Manufacturing Textiles Petroleum Transport Services 
Excise taxes 2.6 12.2 3.0 4.8 1.3 12.9 
GST – domestic 20.9 36.0 17.4 15.9 42.2 29.3 
GST – Imports 12.5 46.5 30.9 0.1 38.7 43.3 
Surcharges 0.3 3.5 2.1 0.0 22.9 5.9 
Custom duties 2.1 29.5 20.9 0.1 9.8 48.7 
Import duty rebate -0.1 -1.0 -0.7 0.0 -0.2 -1.8 
WHT on Imports 7.4 18.1 10.9 2.6 1.9 4.3 
TOTAL 45.7 144.9 84.6 23.5 116.6 142.7 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on FBR Annual Report 2012-13 and SAM 2011. 
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SECTION 4 
REVENUE POTENTIAL OF TAXING AGRICULTURAL INCOMES 
In this section, we use a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to 
simulate the introduction of an agricultural income tax.  We employ the IFPRI Standard 
CGE model [Löfgren, Harris, and Robinson (2002)] paired with a 2010-11 Pakistan SAM 
[PSSP (2015)]. This permits an analysis of the aggregate distributional impacts of 
simulated shocks, taking into account all direct and indirect effects resulting from 
linkages between sectors, given the structure of the economy.  
 
Simulation Results 
Using the model specified in Löfgren, Harris, and Robinson (2002), we find that 
following a ―low-rate-broad-base‖ approach via a nominal rate of income tax of 5 percent 
on all farmers who own more than 12 acres, and do not fall in the poorest quartile, is 
sufficient to raise approximately Rs 43 billion in additional revenues. A higher rate of tax 
of 15 percent (closer to what other sectors may pay) would bring this number to Rs 130 
billion (Table 12).  
 
Table 12 
Impact on Government Revenues 
 
Billion Rs % Change 
Simulated income tax on non-poor, medium and large farmers 
5% Income Tax 43.3 2.6 
10% Income Tax 86.5 5.1 
15% Income Tax 129.6 7.7 
Simulated import duty on cotton yarn 
15 p.p. increase in import duty -0.27 -0.02 
Source:  CGE simulations. 
 
That is, each extra percent point added to the income tax rate is worth about Rs 8 
billion while the impact on other farm households, while negative, is small (Table 13). 
Wage earners in the rural economy and urban households may even benefit slightly.  
Note that these impacts do not account for welfare changes from increased government 
revenues and spending. The impact of taxing larger farmers on GDP is negligible. Even 
in the higher, 15 percent tax rate simulation, GDP falls just by 0.01 percent, driven 
mostly by the crop sector shrinking by 0.06 percent (Table 14). Thus, a non-trivial sum 
can be raised with fairly low rates of taxation on larger, non-poor farmers, and this has, if 
any at all, little negative impact on the economy. To put these findings in perspective, we 
also simulate import duties on yarn, as an example, of actual ad-hoc tax proposals that 
arise from time to time. In recent years (2014-15), the introduction of import duty on yarn 
(which was previously exempt) of 15 percent has been proposed. Our simulation reveals 
that this has little impact on revenue generation and may in fact reduce government 
revenues due to negative effects on textile sectors. In fact, we find that government 
revenues fall by Rs 267 million with little or negative impacts on associated sectors.  
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Table 13 
Impacts on Households’ Expenditure—(Percentage Changes) 
 
Simulations 
Income Tax on Medium-Large Farmers Import duty on yarn 
 
5% Income Tax 10% Income Tax 15% Income Tax 15 p.p. increase 
Larger & Medium Farmers -5.0 -10.1 -15.1 0.001 
Small Farmers -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.002 
Landless Farmers -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.001 
Rural farm-wage earners 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.002 
Rural non-farm-wage earners 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.002 
Urban households 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.001 
Total -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 0.002 
Source: CGE simulations. 
 
Table 14 
Impacts on Sectoral Value Added—(Percentage Changes) 
 
Simulations 
Income tax on non-poor medium-large farmers Import duty on yarn 
 
5% Income Tax 10% Income Tax 15% Income Tax 15 p.p. increase 
Crops -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 0.001 
Horticulture 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.000 
Livestock 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.000 
Mining -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.000 
Ginning 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.002 
Spinning -0.03 -0.06 -0.09 0.030 
Weaving -0.04 -0.08 -0.12 -0.012 
Knitwear 0.03 0.06 0.09 -0.014 
Garment -0.03 -0.07 -0.10 -0.001 
Other Textiles 0.02 0.05 0.07 -0.015 
Other Manufacturing 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.000 
Energy, Constr., Services 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.000 
Total 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.001 
Source: CGE simulations. 
 
SECTION 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Despite agriculture’s importance in its relationship to poverty and welfare of the 
poorest households, the government finds it increasingly difficult to find fiscal space for 
budgetary allocations for agriculture and agricultural R&D.  In this paper, we assessed 
the basic position of agricultural taxes and subsidies in Pakistan to produce a picture of 
its net fiscal position, with an aim to find the fiscal space for productive expenditure on 
the sector.  
Using recent literature, we assessed three main expenditures along with the level 
of taxation of agriculture in Pakistan.  In summary, we found that agriculture pays about 
Rs 46 billion in indirect taxes intermediate goods (primarily fertiliser) but almost no 
direct taxes, as there is no income tax.  Then, about Rs 41 billion of government revenue 
was lost in FY 2012-13 from subsidies to the fertiliser sector via subsidised gas 
feedstock, thus depleting a resource in short supply  and that is sold lower than its 
opportunity cost.  A second area with substantial subsidies is the wheat procurement 
 Fiscal Space for Investment in Agriculture  887 
system where costs of running the system lead to losses of Rs 25 billion on average.  
Dwarfing all of these is the cost of maintaining the irrigation system, where the full cost 
is Rs 166 billion, which is largely unpaid for by the agricultural sector. 
Putting these costs, losses and subsidies together suggests that the tax payments 
are offset by subsidies, ignoring irrigation, as the sector pays Rs 46 billion and receives 
Rs 41 and Rs 25 billion in subsidies, leaving agriculture with a Rs 20 billion benefit.  
However, farmers pay the indirect taxes, while the subsidies go to fertiliser manufacturers 
and select flour millers, so they do not reach farmers.  There appears to be few reasons 
for subsidies to go to these beneficiaries.   
However, the cost of infrastructure and irrigation maintenance is very large and is 
picked up by tax payers and through deferred maintenance so the performance 
deteriorates, as agriculture pays very little.  However, we show that an agricultural 
income tax could generate enough funds to come close to covering the cost of the 
irrigation system as it would generate Rs 148 billion in tax revenues with a 15 percent tax 
rate on medium and large farmers.  Thus the agricultural system could be basically self-
sustaining and have adequate funding with a few reduced subsidies and the presence of 
an agricultural income tax.  The fiscal space can thus be found with a few key changes in 
the expenditures and revenues related to the agricultural sector.       
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